Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Development and Cooperation on the EEC's relations with Namibia; Part "B": Explanatory statement. EP Working Documents 1984-85, Document 1-67/84/B, 30 April 1984 by Enright, Derek
30Apri l 1984 
English Edition 
European Communities 
44-lo /.'40 
44/ • z_(L,) 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1984-1985 
DOCUMENT 1-67184/B 
REPORT 
drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Development 
and Cooperation 
on the EEC's relations with Namibia 
- PART "B" : EXPLANATORY STAT!MENT 
Rapporteur: Mr Derek ENRIGHT 
PE 89.662/fin •. /B 
Or.En. 

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
to the report 
on the EEC's relations with Namibia 
<Doe. 1-67/84/A) 
Rapporteur: Mr D. ENRIGHT 
Part A: Motion for a resolution 
Paragraph 35, 3rd indent: 
Replace 'CID' with 'EIB' 
10 May 1984 
PE 89.662/fin./A/Corr. 

B. 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. NAMIBIA : GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Namibia has been the subject of a protracted international dispute centering 
on the legal status of this former German colony, which has been administered 
by South Africa since the end of World War ~ when the territory was placed 
under a League of Nations Mandate. 
Conflict between the United Nations and the Republic of South Africa over Na-
mibia followed almost immediately after the establishment of the United Nations, 
and has been virtually constant ever since. Initially this was largely due to the 
fact th~t South Africa was not prepared to place the territory under the newly 
created Trt-Usteeship System which entailed, inter -"lia, a periodic United Nations 
review of t~e colonial power's administration of its territory to ensure that 
it was applyi~ policies designed to pave the way for independence. 
Relations between South Africa and the United Nations deteriorated as South 
Africa progressively applied its system of apartheid to Namibia; this was felt 
to be a clear breach of the Charter and of the obligations incumbent upon the 
colonial power under the Trusteeship System. The Trusteeship Council consisten-
ly criticised South Africa's administration of the territory. 
In 1964 the Odendaal Commission,appointed by the South Atrica1 Government, re-
commended that a policy of separate development through segregation be applied 
to Namibia and that self-governing tribal reserves be set up along the lines 
of South Africa's own "homelands" or "Bantustans". The territory had already 
been broadly divided along racial lines. 
In 1966 the General Assembly unilaterally terminated South 
Africa's mandate, and called upon it to withdraw from Namibia and in 1967 it 
set up a United Nations Council for Namibia to give effect to its claim to ad-
minister the territory. In 1970 the Council for Namibia issued Decree N. 1 for the 
the Protection of Namibian Natural Resources, which is designed to prevent the 
exploitation of those resources before independence; it further decrees that 
companies or individuals acting against it will be held liable for damages by 
the government of an independent Namibia. 
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There followed several Security Council Resolutions which specifically r~cog­
nised the termination of the Mandate. In 1970 the Security Council asked the 
Intcernational Court of Justice in The Hague to issue an Advisory Opinion on 
the q~stion of "what are the legal consequences for States of Seut-h -Africa's 
conti,nued presence in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resoluti-oo 276". 
In its landmar-k opinion, the Court reached several conclusions, the most i-m-
portant :being: 
-that 'South Africa's continued presence in Namibia being illegal, it w:as 
under an obligation to withdraw its administration immediately; 
~ St~tes members of the United Nations are under an obligation to recog-
nise the illegality of South Africa's presence and should "refrain from 
any .acts and in particularly any dealing with the Government of South 
Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or 
assistance to,such presence and administration." <1> 
The Security Council added a new and more practical element to the probLem by 
unani.mously adopting a resolution in 1976 (SCR 385(76)) which called for Na-
,mibia to accede to independence through United Nations supervised and control-
~ed elections. This initial plan was further defined in Security Council Reso-
lution 435(78) which included a timetable for accession to independence fol-
lowing the establishment of a cease-fire, and for the deployment of a United 
'Nations .peacekeeping force and the setting up of a parallel administration 
,'U1itecl twtkns Transitional Assistance Gro..p -LNTAG-) which \O.Ild be responsible for security arcl 
the el~ctoral arrangements for an independent constituent assembly. It will 
be noted that the Security Council had dropped its initial insistence on South 
Africa withdrawing prior to elections, and acknowledged the maintainance of 
•arallel administrations during the transitional phase. 
That same year the Western members of the Security Council - Canada, France, 
the Federal Republic of West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United Stat~s­
constituted themselved into a self-appointed Contact Group to negotiate bet-
.ween South Africa and ~~e Sou!h West African People's Organisation (SWAPO> 
,(1) lbe issues of international law surrot.nding the CJ,~estion of Nrlnibia are extremely ~Lex. 
·Cru':ltries universally regard South Africa's contirued presence in N!lnibia as illegal, .even 
thaql their reasons for ooing so may vary. It is generally recog1ised that owing to~ 
tal breaches of the Mandate South Africa had divested itself of any entitlement l.n.ier the 
Mandate, and therefore the international status of N!wnibia still holds since no lawful basis 
has ever existed by which South Africa could have unilaterally altered that international 
status. fobwever, sane states ar~ that since the LN Charter confers only recallll!!l"'dtory p:~Wei"S 
lp:ll'l the General As5elltlly, the As5elltlly could not recog~ise all the powers conferred by the 
Assenbly on the COIIl>lex adninistrative machinery based on its 1966 resolution, such as the 
-~--~i l for Namibi!_~ _'!he l~_l ~tat~ of-~-~ N. 1 is also the subject of sane C<J'Iti"'V'ee"$Y;-
sorne countries however cb observe it. Sweden for ex8111Jle has enacted legislation prohibiting -
investment in South Africa and Nrlnibia. 
As far as trade is concerned, countries cb not provide any export credit prantees or insu-
rance cover. Some countries officially discourage investment in Nrlnibia; the lhited States 
!J)Vemnent has not offered any protection or 9Jarantees for investment since 1966 When the 
LN terminated the Mandate. Trade with Namibia is not baTled at international level however 
since there is no mandatory Security Council Resolution l.n.ier Article 39 of the Charter 
(threat or breach of t~ peace, act of aggression>. 
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under the terms of SCR 435. They set themselves a two-year deadline. 
The Contact Group's negotiations proved to be a laborious and painstaking 
process, which lasted far longer than envisaged at the outset. Agreement 
foundered over successive obstacles thrown up in the path of negotiatiors; 
the principal ones being: 
- United Nations impartiality; the South African government maintained that 
this had been jeopardised by the General Assembly's designation of the 
South West African People's Organisation <SWAPO) as the "sole and authen-
tic representatives of the Namibian people" (the OAU has conferred the 
same status on SWAPO); 
- the size and the composition of the United Nations Transitional Assistan-
ce Group (UNTAG); 
- the choice of the ele~toral system to be used. 
All these issues, with the exception of the electoral system, have been re-
solved, and it is generally acknowledged that important concessions have been 
made during the negotiations, particularly by South West African People's 
Organisation. While South Africa accepted the United Nations' role, the South 
West African People's Organisation for its part acknowledged that it would be 
one of the parties contesting the elections, which would be organised on an 
electoral system of South Afri ea's own choosing. (1) 
However further and decisive progress was effectively stalled when South Afri-
ca., with American support, made it known in the summer of 1982,that irrplelllel'ltation 
of the United Nations settlement plan depended on the prior withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from Angola (this became known as "linkage"). 
Major political changes in Southern Africa have meant that South Africa's deter-
mination not to relinquish control of Namibia has progressively shifted from 
its traditional eccrmic ard political gi"'l.nl (its considerabl~ eccrmic wealth, almost ex-
clusively derived from minerals, accrued to South African companies in the form 
of profits and dividends, and to the government in the form of tax revenues ) 
(1)-Sout~-~rrlca-is now on record as stating that all the outstanding issues 
under Resolution 435 have been resolved. (See the Further Report of the 
Secretary General CJncerning the lmplementation of Security Council Reso-
Lution 435(78> and 439(78) Concerning the Question of Namibia, United Na-
tions Security Council, S/15943, 29 August 1983). During consultations held 
in August 1983, South Africa had given Mr Perez de Cuellar an undertaking 
that it would notify him of its choice of an electoral system before the 
end of 1984. Mr Perez de Cuellar has recently officially informed the Secu-
rity Council of South Africa's failure to do so. 
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as strategi co-mi L itary as well as pol itic<:ll c01siderati01s have g_ained the upper hand. 
The South West African People's Organisation had already lent a military diaen-
sion to the conflict when it Launched its first attack against South African 
forces in the Eastern Caprivi strip in 1968. However, the military conflict in-
side Namibia was restricted to minor skirmishes and Limited incursions by groups 
of guerillas for several years. 
The sudden collapse of Portugal's African empire in1974cn!.thetailingtopcwrin An-
gola and Mozambique of avowedly Left-wing governments not only created an arc 
of radical black states around South Africa, but also quickly Led to an intensi-
fication of the armed struggle in Namibia as SWAPO began to operate out of ba·ses 
in Angola. Zimbabwe's simultaneous accession to independence in 1981 and the 
victory of Robert Mugabe in the elections further closed the circle, even though 
Zimbabwe never allowed SWAPO to Launch military operations from its territory. 
South Africa's unsuccessful invasion of Angola in the summer of 1975 had already 
hardened the armed fbrces resolve to strengthen South Africa's military and 
strategic position in the region. The new Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, himself 
a former Minister of Defence, was a more sympathetic and effective supporter of 
this new policy. 
In t1he late seventies South Africa then launched a multi-sided policy in Southern 
Africa designed to weaken neighbouring countries by combining support for rebel 
movements and military reprisals, sabotaging k~y trans~ort and cocmunications 
net~orks, reducing trace, tourism and migrantlabour's access to the South Afri-
can Labour markets, and generally seeking to "destabilise" them whilst being 
careful not to bring down their governments. At the same time their tougher policy 
wls coupled with diplomatic overtures, particularly with Angola as secret talks 
were held throughout 1982 in the Cape Verde Islands. 
As far as Namibia was concerned, South Africa succeeded in moving the war from 
northern Namibia to ~outhern ~ngola by continuing to occupy the southern provinces 
of Angola it had invaded in the ~ummer of 1981. It also sought to weaken the MPLA 
government in Luanda by providing military and Logistical support to a rival 
movement Led by Jonas Savimbi, UNITA. 
By r~ising the issue of Linkage South Africa led the negotiations into a 
diplomatic deadlock that mirrored the military stalemate inside Namibia. It became 
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obvious that neither side could win the war in Namibia; SWAPO did not have the 
military capacity to overwhelm South African forces, but neither could South 
Africa vanquish SWAPO. Recent events have dramatically altered the situation in 
southern /'.frica and have raised the prospect of independence for Namibia. 
In October 1983 President Machel of Mozambique embarked on a major tour of Western 
capitals, confirming his government's desire to improve relations with the West. 
Mozambique's economic difficulties, compounded by drought and continuing rebel ac-
tivities explain his wish to align Mozambique more firmly with the West. Mozambique's 
application to join the future ACP-EEC Convention is another clear and tangible 
sign of what is a major policy realignment. 
South Africa's Foreign Minister, Mr Pik Botha, followed in President Machel's 
steps by visiting several Western European capitals at the end of November. At a 
press conference held in London prior to his departure, he suggested that with-
drawl of Cuban forces from Angola might be staged "parallel" and not prior to im-
plementation of the United Nations' plan. 
Mozambique and South Africa subsequently entered into bilateral talks on a wide 
range of economic and security issues. These culminated in a historic ministerial 
meeting in Maputo in February 1983, and in the signing of a non-aggression pact. 
A major American diplomatic initiative focusing on Angola and South Africa has run 
parallel to develcpiiE!I'lts with Mozambique. 
It is believed that the groundwork for the recent progress achieved in Angola was 
laid at a series of little-noticed meetings between Chester Crocker, the American 
Assistant Secretary of State, and both Mr P.W. Botha and Mr Pik Botha. The United 
States had already given South Africa a clear signal that they should pursue a 
more concessionary policy by abstaining on the December United Nations Security 
Council resolution which condemned South Africa's latest incursion into Angola, 
launched at the beginning of December. 
On January 31 Prime Minister Botha made a mjor policy statement on Namibia in 
Parliament which seemed to herald a significant policy shift. 
He teclared that Namibia was not a part of South Africa and had never been re-
garded as such by South Africa. He spoke repeatedly of South Africa's "heavy bur-
den" and "sacrifice" in Namibia, and added that South Africa was not prepared to 
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continue to bear thctburden "if it seems that the continued presence of our 
forces does not enjoy the whole-hearted support of the people of South West 
Afr'ica." Mr Botha's words betrayed a profound war-weariness, and he referred 
to the economic cost of Namibia in uncharacte~istically blunt language. South 
Africa, he said, had made 600 M Rand of assistance available to the territo-
ry that year; a further 400-500 M Rand hac! been spent "on the security and 
protection" of the people of South West Africa. At 1 billion Rand, South Afri-
ca's assistance "must surely be regarded as one of the most generous foreign 
aid- programs anywhere in the world today". 
Finally, he announced that South Africa would unilaterally disengage its for-
ces from Angola. 
Informed observers have suggested that Mr Botha could afford to signal to his 
white electorate that perhaps the time to let go of Namibia had come because 
he had secured his political position thanks to his decisive victory in the No-
vember constitutional referendum. Furthermore, he does not face a fresh election 
for at least another two years. 
Angola and South Arica settled the terms of the disengagement at the Luanda 
Summit of mid-February, where they also set up a Joint Commission to monitor 
the ceasefire. The Americans have opened a small office in Windhoek to help 
monitor the ceasefire, if necessary. 
Does this ceasefire pave the way for implementation of SCR 435? 
The ceasefire in Angola is a fragile one. It is underpinned by a series of im-
plicit commitments and tacit assumptions: 
-the Angolan government has undertaken to restrain SWAPO guerillas, and to 
ensure that neither they nor Cuban troops move into the areas vacated by 
Southern African forces; 
- the South African government will cut off supplies to UNITA and also seek to 
restrain them from taking advantage of the vacuum left by their forces. 
Nonetheless, the fact that negotiations have seemed to stray away from the 
issue of Namibian independence and implementation of Resolution 435 to focus 
almost exclusively on the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers and security in Angola 
has awoken fears that South Africa is seeking to bypass Resolution 435 comple-
tely, and still seeks to impose its own constitutional "dispensation" on Namibia. 
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The withdrawal of Cuban troops is a major policy goal of both the United States 
and South Africa. <1> 
Mr Botha's January 31 speech certainly did not contain any indication that South 
Africa was concerned to proceed to a speedy implementation of SCR 435, and it 
included a clear- and possibly politically significant -message to those of Na-
mibia's internal political parties currently meeting as a self-designed Multi-
Party Conference to "demonstrate their willingness to produce a viable political 
solution". <It is interesting to note that the Christian Democratic Union Party, 
which represents the white German speaking population, is not taking part in 
the Conference, leaving a clear field to the Democratic Turnha[e Alliance and 
the right-wing National Party; some left wing and black parties are also repre-
sented). South Africa's recent offer to meet SWAPO at an all party peace Con-
ference has been given a frosty reception by Western countries, who tend to 
regard it as one of South Africa's more transparent attempts to sidestep SCR 435.(2) 
In fact, the disengagement in Angola may yet turn out to be the first in a series 
of steps which could result in Namibia gaining its independence in 1984: 
- after South Africa withdraws its remaining troops from Angola, the Angolan 
government would declare that the conditions for the departure of the Cuban 
troops had been create~;_ 
- South Africa \lould announce that betause of the "pending departure" of Cuban 
troops, it would begin implementing SCR 435; 
- Washington could then announce its resumption of normal diplomatic relations 
with Angola; 
- following a ceasefire between SWAPO and South Africa in Namibia, the United 
Nations could deployUNTAG to monitor the ceasefire and help organise and 
supervise elections to an independent constituent assembly. 
<1> The Joint South Africa-Angola Communique issued in Lusaka did include the 
following statement: " ••• the Lusaka meeting constitutes an important and 
constructive step towards the peaceful resolution of the problems of the 
region, including the question of implementation of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 435." 
(2) See the Financial Times of Monday, March 12, and Tuesday, March 13, 1984. 
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However, a senior South African Foreign Ministry Official was .recently quoted 
as saying that it was premature for South Africa to commit itself to an "af'ti-
ficial timetale" and that, "We are opposed to this sort of artificial grand 
desi9n which raises expectationswhich it may not be possible to meet".(1) 
If Resolution 435 is to be implemented soon, the question of meeting the cons-
iderable financial expense involved in its deployment will become a matter of 
g·reat urgency. The EEC could play a vital role in helping to meet the cost. 
II. ltlE fFC AND NAMIBIA 
a) Tb! .. f!!m!~2!~-fgr_fr!:!D9!e!DQ!D£! ... !i9 
- !me!Jm!D1!1i2D ... 2! ... §!£~!i!X ... f2YD£i! ... B!~21Y!i2D ... ~~2 
There can be little doubt that UNTAG's most important tasks will involve respons· 
ibi t'ity fo·r security arrangements, and ensuring that elections are both free and 
fair .. The experiem:e of Zimbabwe is highly instructive in this respect, for it 
high·lighted the crucial importance of all parties having equal access to the media, 
freedom of movement throughout the country, and generally being allowed to reach 
voters dif'ectly through public meetings and the distribution of printed materials. 
The Community could play a valuable role by allocating funds for this specific 
pur,pose, as the legitimacy of the elected government of an independent Namibia 
w~ll be ·measured in terms of the fairness of the elections which will bring it 
to power. 
Anothe.r key issue related to the holding of free and fair elections is that of Na• 
mibiaos who .will be coming back to the country, and who will wish to exercise 
their democratic right to ·vote. The EEC could target support for this particular 
pU1"poS·e at an early stage, possibly even prior to independence, after which the 
problem of resettling refugees will be posed even more starkly for the new govern-
ment. 
.. !b!-SIY!~1i2D ... 2Ler!:iD9!e!DQ!D£! ... !i9 ... !2 ... ~!!!!i~i! 
Providing direct goverrwnental aid to Namibia raises many questions of a political, 
and some observers would go so tar as to argue,of an ethical nature. The current 
(1) This section draws from "Pretoria denies timetable has been agreed for 
Namibia settlement~ by Michael Hornsby, The Times, 28 February 1984. 
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position is that very little direct aid has been made available, as this would 
be in breach of the United Nations' framework and would be regarded as tanta-
mount to strengthening and even legitimizing South Africa's rule, universally re-
regarded as illegal. 
Recently the question of providing international relief was mQoted owing to 
the serious effects of the drought in Namibia, particularly in the rural areas. 
However, it is significant to note that the United Nations Secretary General's 
carefully worded invitation to the international community to consider the pos-
sibility of channeling humanitarian assistance to Namibia has not met with any 
noticeable response. (1) 
The international community generally feels that under present circumstances it 
would be both politically unacceptable and undesirable to increase current flows 
of direct humanitarian aid to any significant level. 
Nonetheless there is a growing interest, especially in some EEC countries - and 
notably amongst members of the Contact Group - in providing some aid, and in 
particular humanitarian aid, at an early stage to Namibia, if appropriate channels 
can be found. 
It is generally recognised that in view of the considerable constraints involved 
such flows will always be modest. The main criterion for such aid is that the bene-
ficiary must be in independent, private, non-political body or organisation not 
connected in any way to the internal administration. 
The bulk of the predominantly humanitarian aid, as well as aid for education and 
training provided in this way, has been granted directly by European NGOs -
notably Protestant and Catholic ones -working through counterpart organisations 
in Namibia, by several EEC countries (notably Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands) and Nordic countries through eo-financing of NGO 
projects, and by the World Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Federation. 
The main beneficiary has been the Namibian Council of Churches, which was esta-
blished in 1978 and is composed of the main denominations in Namibia. It com-
prises the Anglican, Lutheran, Methodist, Roman Catholic, United Congregational, 
<1>'~he present cycle of drought in southern Africa as a whole is having a de-· 
vastating impact on the national economy and the every-day Life of the people 
of the Territory. In the circumstances the international community might wish 
to consider what could be done to provide humanitarian assistance to support 
local efforts in this regard." ·~~~t~~~-~!P-~~t-~f_tQ~-~~~t~tqC(_q~Q~tql_~qu~~t­
n j !liL.! .b ~ _j !!.P J. ~!l~!l.!li.!J.91L gj _ ..S~J:.urj.t,y_J;_p.uncJ.l...Re..sD l.uU.an.ltliU.8)_ .and..lt39il.B.L -Cml-
c~!~j!,l~_!_ti!_~Y~§!j9!1_9J_~ll!ljgjg, United Nations Security Council, S/15943, 
29 August 1983. 
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and-Methodist Episcopal Churches. The Namibian Council of Churches is thus ·an 
ecwmenical body which has become increasingly involved in educational and grass-
roots development work, especially in the rural areas where the overwhelming 
maj<Drity of black Namibians live. In addition to these main activiti-es, it pro-
vides legal advice and legal aid, social welfare services to those in distress 
and disseminates information abroad and within the country concerning ·Namibi-a 
regularly. 
The prominent role played by the Churches of Namibia is a special -and highly 
particuLar feature of the country, and reflects the fact that 70% of the popu-
lation ~rds itself as practising Christians. 
There is further scope for providing direct aid by supporting local community 
projects, such as the recently established community centre in Katatura, the 
blaGk township of Windhoek (population: 80,000) which ~ill be used to develop 
training, education, and recreational facilities. Yet another example of such 
initiatives are two recently established independent schools, the Martin Luther 
King School and the Gideon Community School. 
Ver.y littl-e direct aid is presently going to Namibia for education and training. 
Some EEC :governments have an open mind on channeling such aid directly, provided 
that a .suitable counterpart organisation can be found. There is however an increased 
will!i-ngness to allow internal candidates to apply for training and educational 
pragr~mmes in Europe or in neighbouring countries on the same footing as Namibians 
living outside t·he country, in view of the generalLy appalling educational system 
for;.bl.acks in Namibia. There is an especially acute need for English language 
teacller training.' The EEC should extend further support to such programmes, as welL 
as·J'i)roviding scholarships and bursaries to Namibians both outside and inside the 
COUAtry. 
- _.,,~~1·,.~ .to Namibia !J ~ .. _________ _ 
The ,international community of donors provides substantial aid to Namibi~n refugees 
and•to the various United Nations programmes and funds set up to meet the ·acute 
need for qualified administrators and skilled manpower of an independent Namibi.a. 
The total number of Namibian refugees is estimated at 85,000, of which some 75·-80,000 
live in Angol-a, with the next largest group of 5,000 in Zambia. Of this number 
approximately half live in the Large settlement of Kwanz.a Sul, which comprises some 
twelve camps situated in the province of the same name in Angola. 
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The other half lives in the southern part of the country, where they have mingled 
with the local population which comes from much the same ethnic background. Inter-
national relief officials do not have access to this area because of the security 
situation; nonetheless some European NGOs, such as the British group War on Want, 
have been able to operate in the area by distributing limited quantities of food 
aid and providing other essential services. These Namibian refugees, along with 
' the local Angolan population, are the ~s who are enduring the greatest hardship 
and suffering. 
The refugees living in the Kwanza Sul settlement are assisted by the United Nations 
J 
High Commissioner for Refugees, whose role is to monitor and ensure that interna-
tional assistance reaches its intended beneficiaries. UNHCR has the necessary staff 
in Angola to conduct proper monitoring, and is fully satisfied that it is able to 
fulfil its mandate in Kwanza Sul. 
The main financial backer of the camps is the Swedish International Development 
Authority (SIDA>; the minimum food needs are met by WFP which provides a basic ra-
tion. This is topped up by other donors, mainly SIDA but others as well, as WFP does 
not cover all the food needs of the population <WFP's food assistance for 1980-84 
covered the supply of 23,453 tonnes of basic food commodities; a one-year extension 
covering 11,365 tonnes is to be submitted to the May 1984 session of WFP's govern-
ing board) ; 80~ of the population are women, and the remaining 20~ are mainly 1 
school-children and the aged. 
The Angolan government has allocated land for the growing of food crops (the camp 
is situated on a former coffee plantation) however it has not been possible to 
obtain a significant food crop because of drought and the lack of proper irrigation 
facilities, as well as the absence of suitable land clearing equipment and other 
agricultural inputs. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has set up a comprehensive human-
itarian assistance programme in Kwanza Sul, designed to train and educate refugees 
and help them to become more self-sufficient by lessening their dependence on in-
ternational aid. The World University Service, (WUS - a private voluntary organi-
sation>, SIDA, and other donors run an extensive educational programme for children 
and to combat adult illitera~y. The Nordic countries also run a hospital. 
However, there is a continuing need 
total donation for Namibian refugees 
granted to UNHCR for its projects in 
• for funds to support these programmes. The EEC's 
stands at 4 MECU; however the 1,8 MECU last 
November 1982 has been spent, and no further 
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grants have been made. It is recommended that further humanitarian aid, in the 
for• of emergency aid as well as aid to projects designed to help refugees become 
mo•e self-reliant <line 936 of the budget> be granted. 
The EEC has also made some 800 tonnes of food aid available through NGOs to re-
fugees and displaced persons in Angola. 
Finally,additional funding is provided to the UN Nationhood Programme, the Fund 
fo~ Namibia, and the Namibia Institute in Lusaka. The UN Programmes are largely 
designed to train administrators and other skilled personnel for an independent 
Na~ibia. The EEC has contributed 1,5 MECU to the Lusaka Institute under the re-
gional cooperation fund of the Lome Convention. 
It is soaetimes felt that the EEC has tended to rely on the Lome Convention to as-
sist Namibians. While this can be easily explaiMd by the fact that the Convention 
does provide a relatively easy way of providing such assistance, there can be no 
doubt that the EEC has both additional instruments and resources to step up its 
humanitarian assistance to Namibian refugees, particularly as far as education, 
trq.ining, and agriculture are concerned. 
The political situation in southern Africa is undergoing a rapid evolution which 
will have a direct bearing on Namibia's long delayed accession to sovereignty 
and independence through implementation on the United Nations' settlement plan. 
In view of the Community's consistent and firm commitment to international efforts 
to solve the Namibian question, its formal links with~t countries of southern 
Africa through the Lome Convention, as well as its support for SADCC it is impor-
tant that the Community take the initiative in preparing the ground for an inde-
pendent Namibia. The current negotiations for the future ACP/EEC Convention pro-
vide a unique opportunity for the EEC, together with its ACP partners, to plan 
ahead and hold out the prospect o~ a long-term political and economic relation-
ship with an independent Namibia. 
It should do this for three reasons: 
- it would acknowledge Namibia's importance to the southern African region, where 
it constitutes the last link in the chain of countries grouped in .SADCC and/or 
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the Lome Convention; 
- it would avert financial or budgetary difficulties which could arise if Namibia 
were to join the future convention mid-stream; 
- it would encourage the international community to coordinate future international 
assistance for Namibia, and to identify priorities for aid. 
Provision should be made for Namibia in a protocol or declaration attached to the 
Convention. 
The international community as a whole will play an important part in helping the 
government of an independent Namibia take its first faltering steps after independen·· 
ce, and doubtless there will be an international pledging conference along the 
lines of ZIMCORD, organised shortly after Zimbabwe became independent. 
It is equally obvious that the future government will play an active role in 
setting priorities and drawing up development programmes; it is very difficult to 
pinpoint the substance of such programmes without the agreement of the recipient 
country. 
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that precise knowledge of the Namibian 
economy can be difficult, and has been hampered by the fact that South Africa 
stopped publishing official statistics several years ago. Nonetheless the main 
features of the economy, as well as the main constraints, are known. 
The vast, arid, and sparsely populated territory of Namibia <with a population 
generally estimated at around 1.1-1.2.million) has an almost exclusively export-
' 
oriented economy largely dependent on minerals (principally diamonds and uranium, 
but also base metals; they accounted for 30% of GDP in 1981). The camercial 
farming sector, dominated by livestock breeding, with three quarters of animals 
being exported on-the-hoof for slaughter and sale in South Africa accounted 
for another 10% of GDP in 1981. Two other key export products, Karakul pelts 
(the ~kara fur > and fish have virtually collapsed, the former because of we~k 
demand on world markets, :and the latter because of overfishing. Namibia imports 
most of its food needs from South Africa, and wholly exports potential food 
products (the visitor to Windhoek will learn much to his or her surprise that it 
is impossible to find fresh fish in the city>. There is virtually no manufacturing 
or intermediate industry in the country. Most of its import needs, especially 
processed and capital goods, are supplied by South Africa, In fact Namibia is for 
allintents and purposes economically integrated into South Africa. The combined 
effects of drought and economic recession have shown just how vulnerable it is, 
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as the ~ic situation has markedly deteriorated over the last few years. 
Assistance in the wake of independence will in all likelihood be targeted to the 
foHowing areas: 
-the repatriation of refugees will cause major social and economic problems; a 
~onsiderable role has been reserved for UNHCR within the UNTAG operation to im-
plement the voluntary repatriation of refugees as well as their establishment; 
a S 45,000,000 programme has already been drawn up; 
- the need to replace South African expatriate staff in government ministries and 
public bodies will pose further serious problems, and it will be much more acute 
in Namibia than it was in Zimbabwe, where there was a truly national civil ser-
vice; 
- the need to repair and rebuild war devastated parts of the country. 
Long-term development assistance may concentrate on the following, bearing in 
mind that this is not intended by any means to be an exhaustive list: 
- training and education; there is an acute need for trained manpower and general 
~ducation; a few telling statistics will illustrate just how serious the pro-
blems are. Out of 55,101 black p.pils enrolled in the first year of primary school 
in 1981, only 348 finished secondary school. In 1982, black enrollment was esti-
mated at just over 200,000 or 16X of the black population. Of these fully 71X 
were in lower primary school, only 22X were in upper primary school, and an 
astounding 7% in secondary school and vocational training; (1) 
- English language and teacher training; the teaching of Afrikaans reinforces Na-
mibians• isolation; for example, one of the most important educational programmes 
run by the Namibian Council of Churches is study groups for adults who are learn-
ing English; 
agricultural training; the improvement of subsistence agriculture will be a major 
priority (it accounts for only 5X of GDP even though nearly half the population 
i s e.ngaged in i t ) ; 
land resettlement; Zimbabwe highlights just how crucial this is both economically 
and socially; 
rehabilitating the fishing industry; overfishing of formerly abundant species like 
~ilch~rd, especially by South African operators and foreign trawlers, resulted in 
a total pilchard ban in 1981. Many South African companies have already moved their 
ope.rations to South Africa and Chile; in any case the fishing and canning industry 
is concentrated in Walvis Bay, over which the South Africans claim sovereignty. 
The number of jobs in the industry has fallen dramatically; 
C1) See, Education, Repression and Liberation in Namibia A Future for Namibia 4, Justin Ellis Catbolic 
Institue for International Relabons, l.orlcb1; 1984. ' ' 
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irrigation; this is especially crucial in the rainier northern farming ar~as 
where the subsistence agricultural economy could be improved; some parts of the 
country also have ground water, which could be tapped; 
energy supplies; the Cunene scheme along the northern border is especially im-
portant, for when it is fully operational-thus far, the Angolan government has 
not been prepared to operate the vital Caleque diversion - it could provide the 
power for developing industry and irrigating northern farming areas. 
The future~EEC Convention, through its existing instruments, and it is hoped, 
through special provision for SADCC which it should effectively treat as a sub-re-
gional unit, contains many of the instruments which an independent Namibia could 
use. 
Ill - CONCLUSIONS 
Only time will tell whether the latest initiatives launched in southern Africa 
will turn out to be another false dawn as far as Namibian independence is concerned. 
Its past vicissitudes invite some skepticism! It is vital at this time for th& 
EEC to reiterate its full support. for implem•ntation of SCR 435, and to back up that 
commitment by offering an independent Namibia a clear opportunity for permanent 
political and economy Cinks. 
However, the Community should not wait for full independence before granting aid, 
and indeed it has not done so. Some conditional direct aid should be made available 
for humanitarian purposes. In addition the Community can step up aid to Namqbians 
outside the country, both through aid for Namibian refugees, and by offering a 
fuller panoply of training and education possibilities for Namibians living outside 
their country. 
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Kingdom; 
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Cooperation, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels; 
- Ambassador SINCLAIR, United Nations Council for Namibia; 
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Office, United Kingdom; 
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The Danish International Development Agency CDANIDA>, Copenhagen,~rk, 
The Finnish Mission to the European Communities, Brussels, Belgium, 
- The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation, Bonn, West Germany, 
- The Interchurch Coordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCO>, 
Zeist, The Netherlands, 
The Italian Permanent Representation to the European Communities, 
Brussels, Belgium, 
The Office of the Minister Responsible for European Affairs, Paris, France, 
Rio Tinto Zinc Services Limited, London, United Kingdom, 
- The Swedish International Development Authority CSIDA), Stockholm, Sweden, 
- The United Nations Development Programme, Geneva, Switzerland, 
- The United Nations High:Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Switzerland, 
The World Council of Churches, Geneva, Switzerland~ 
- The World Food Programme, Rome, Italy. 
I cannot omit the thorough and ungrudging work done by Marina Baraldini of 
the Secretariat of the Development and Cooperation Committee of the European 
Parliament. 
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MOTION FOR A RES·OLUTION DOCUMENT 1-362/83 
tabled by Mr MULL£R-HERMANN, Mr CROUX, Mr LUSTER, 
Mr BARB[ ·and Mr VERGEER 
~n behalf Of the EPP Group (Christian-Democratic Group) 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on e~onomic and trade relations with Namibia 
Ih~-s~!:QQ~!!!J_~!!r1i!!~!J!-~ 
A. having regard to its resolution on the need for development aid to 
Namibia of 13 January 1983, 
B. having regard to the growing economic difficulties facing Namibia because 
of the political uncertainty regarding the future of the country, 
Calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that trade relations 
between the European Community and Namibia do not suffer on a~~ount of 
the political climate ~nd that, as far as respect for its trade interests 
is concerned, Namibia is no less favourably placed than other comparable 
African states, e.g. in regard to the granting of guarantees by 
government agencies. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION DOCUMENT 1-1125/83 
tabled by Mr PEARCE 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the independence for Namibia 
Ih~-~YrQe~!o_e!r!i!m~o!, 
A - concerned that the granting of independence of Namibia continues to be 
deadlocked, 
B - criticizing the intransigent attitude of the South African Government 
in the negotiations, 
C - concerned at the continued presence of foreign troops in the region, 
D - criticizing the General Assembly's insistence at regarding SWAPO as the 
sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, 
E- aware of the legitimate role that is played by some internal political 
parties in working towards a peaceful independence, 
F - reaffirming that the international community must not take any action 
that might prolong South African occupation of Namibia, 
1. Calls on the contact group and all the parties involved to implement 
the UN plan for Namibia's independence as set out in Resolution 435 
and other resolutions; 
2. Calls on the South African Government to respect the international 
community's call to end the illegal occupation of Namibia; 
3. Asks that the UN does not block the participation of genuine internal 
political parties in Namibia in the negotiations for a settlement, 
since the exclusion of either SWAPO or the internal political parties 
will continue to make a solution diff1cult; 
4. Calls on the Governments of the Member States of the EEC to use their 
influence with all the parties concerned to bring about a solution; 
5. Believes that the current deadlock of Namibia's future is hindering the 
development possibilities of the country and causing unnecessary hard-
ship to the Namibian people. Accordingly asks that consideration b& 
given to the following action, without in any way reinforcing or 
Legitimising the South African occupation: 
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- provision of aid for training Namibians whether they are in the country 
or abroad by the EEC and other aid donors; 
- provision of development ass;stance under the EEC Non-Associated Aid 
Programme; 
- improving trade opportunities with Namibia and encouraging foreign 
companies to invest in the country according to an appropriate Code 
of Conduct. 
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